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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 The Estate of John Thouron (“the Estate”) filed a 
complaint contending that the Internal Revenue Service 
improperly failed to refund the penalty assessed the Estate for 
late payment of its tax liability.  It argues that its reliance on 
the advice of its expert tax counsel excused the failure to pay 
by the deadline set by statute.  The United States (the 
“Government”), on behalf of the IRS, moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted the motion, holding 
that under Supreme Court precedent the Estate could not 
show “reasonable cause,” a required element to excuse late 
payment, based on expert advice under these facts.  Because 
it may be possible for the Estate to establish reasonable cause, 
we vacate and remand for further proceedings in the District 
Court.   
I. Background 
 Sir John Thouron (“Thouron”) died on February 6, 
2007 at the age of 99, leaving behind a substantial estate.  
Because both his wife and only child predeceased him, 
Thouron’s two grandchildren are his only heirs.  In his will, 
he named Charles H. Norris (“Norris”) executor of his estate.  
Norris, in turn, retained Cecil Smith (“Smith”), an 
experienced tax attorney, to provide tax advice for the Estate. 
 As discussed below, the Estate’s tax return and 
payment were initially due by November 6, 2007.  On that 
date, the Estate filed a request for an extension of time to file 
its return and made a payment of $6.5 million, which was 
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much less than it would ultimately owe.  The Estate argues 
that it did not pay the balance of its liability or, in the 
alternative, request an extension of time to pay at least in part 
because of advice from Smith relating to the possibility of 
electing to defer certain liabilities under 26 U.S.C. § 6166.  
This provision allows qualifying estates to elect to pay a 
portion of their tax liability in installments over several years.  
As requested, the Estate received an automatic six-month 
extension of time to file the return, which put the deadline at 
May 6, 2008. 
 The Estate timely filed its return in May 2008 and on 
the same day requested an extension of time to pay.  It made 
no election to defer taxes under § 6166, because by that time 
it had conclusively determined it did not qualify.  The IRS 
denied as untimely the Estate’s request for an extension of 
time to pay and subsequently notified the Estate that it was 
imposing a failure-to-pay penalty, which the Estate 
unsuccessfully appealed administratively.  After losing the 
administrative appeal, the Estate filed an appropriate form 
and paid all outstanding amounts, including a penalty of 
$999,072, plus accrued interest on the penalty.  Three months 
later, it filed a request with the IRS for a refund of that 
amount.  After not receiving a response from the IRS, the 
Estate filed a complaint in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking the refund and alleging that its failure 
to pay resulted from reasonable cause and not willful neglect 
(thus not subject to penalty).  The Government moved for 
summary judgment, and the District Court granted the 
motion.  The Estate timely appeals. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 Because the Estate is seeking the refund of a 
previously paid tax penalty, the District Court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
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U.S.C. § 1291.  We review summary judgment orders de 
novo.  Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep’t, 98 
F.3d 107, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1996).  In this review, we apply the 
same test as the District Court, id. at 112, which states that 
“[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
III. Analysis 
 Under the Internal Revenue Code, an estate is required 
to file an estate and gift tax return within nine months after 
the decedent’s death.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6075.  Unless properly 
extended or subject to some exception, the payment of tax is 
due at the same time as the relevant return.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 6151(a).  Here, the nine-month deadline was November 6, 
2007.  Although the Estate requested and received an 
automatic six-month extension of the time to file, “[a]n 
extension of time for filing a return does not operate to extend 
the time for payment of the tax.” Treas. Reg. § 20.6081-1(e); 
see also 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a) (stating that the payment 
deadline is “determined without regard to any extension of 
time for filing the return”).  Therefore, despite the filing 
extension, the Estate was required to pay its full tax liability, 
ultimately calculated at just over $20 million, on or before the 
November deadline.  Instead, the Estate paid only part of its 
tax liability, $6.5 million, by that date.   
 If a tax is not paid in full by the prescribed due date, a 
mandatory penalty is assessed of “0.5 percent of the amount 
of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an 
additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction 
thereof during which such failure continues,” up to a 
maximum of 25 percent.  26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(2).  The 
penalty applies “unless it is shown that such failure is due to 
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reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.” Id.  The 
“heavy burden” of showing both elements falls on the 
taxpayer.  United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985).   
 A taxpayer shows reasonable cause for failure to pay a 
tax on time by establishing that “he [or she] exercised 
ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment 
of his [or her] tax liability and was nevertheless either unable 
to pay the tax or would suffer an undue hardship . . . if he [or 
she] paid on the due date.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1).  
Among other things, the Estate argues that its reliance on the 
advice of Smith, a tax expert, as to the applicable tax law was 
reasonable cause for the failure to pay its full tax liability by 
the November 2007 deadline.   
 The District Court read the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boyle to preclude any finding of reasonable cause based on 
reliance on an expert or other agent.  “The Court [there] 
established a bright line rule that the ‘failure to make a timely 
filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer’s reliance 
on an agent, and such reliance is not ‘reasonable cause’ for a 
late filing.’” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10 (quoting Boyle, 469 U.S. at 
252).  Although the opinion of the District Court 
acknowledged that retaining Smith was an exercise of 
“ordinary business care and prudence,” it concluded that 
“reliance on an agent for compliance with unambiguous 
deadlines does not constitute ‘reasonable cause’ for a late 
payment of tax within the meaning of Section 6651(a)(2).” Id. 
at 13.   
 While Boyle was a late-filing case, the District Court 
adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court in Baccei v. 
United States, 632 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), to conclude that 
“the holding in Boyle applies with equal force to a failure to 
pay a tax because the ‘reasonable cause’ excuse for failing to 
file a return or pay a tax timely in both subsections is the 
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same.”1 Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1)-
(2)).  We agree that Boyle is relevant to failure-to-pay cases.  
See E. Wind Indus., Inc. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499, 504 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1999).  The District Court, however, applied 
Boyle more bluntly than would we.   
 As we read it, Boyle identifies three distinct categories 
of late-filing or, by extension, late-payment cases. In the first 
category, a taxpayer relies on an agent for the ministerial task 
of filing or paying.  See Boyle, 469 U.S. at 249-50.  In the 
second, “in reliance on the advice of his [or her] accountant 
or attorney, the taxpayer files a return after the actual due date 
but within the time the adviser erroneously told him [or her] 
was available.” Id. at 251 n.9.  In the third, “an accountant or 
attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law[.]” Id. at 
251 (emphasis in original).   
 By its facts, Boyle fits into the first category.  Robert 
W. Boyle was the executor of the will of his mother, Myra 
Boyle, and retained an attorney, Ronald Keyser, on behalf of 
his mother’s estate.  Id. at 242.  Boyle “relied on Keyser for 
                                              
1 Contrary to the District Court’s statement, the definitions of 
“reasonable cause” for failure to file and failure to pay are 
similar but not identical. Reasonable cause for failure to file is 
shown where “the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care 
and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return 
within the prescribed time[.]” Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1). 
Reasonable cause excuses failure to pay, as noted above, “to 
the extent that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing 
that he [or she] exercised ordinary business care and prudence 
in providing for payment of his [or her] tax liability and was 
nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an 
undue hardship (as described in [Treas. Reg. § 1.6161-1(b)]) 
if he [or she] paid on the due date.” Id. 
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instruction and guidance.” Id.  Although Boyle repeatedly 
checked in with Keyser on the status of the estate’s return, the 
attorney “overlooked the matter because of a clerical 
oversight in omitting the filing date from Keyser’s master 
calendar.” Id. at 243.  As a result, the return was not filed 
until almost three months after the deadline.  Id.  In this 
context, the Court opined that executors have a “fixed and 
clear” duty to ensure that returns are timely filed that cannot 
be discharged by delegating responsibility to an attorney or 
accountant.  Id. at 249-50; see also id. at 250 (“That the 
attorney, as the executor’s agent, was expected to attend to 
the matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to comply 
with the statute.”).  Thus, when the Supreme Court reached 
the holding quoted by the District Court,  the relevant 
“reliance on an agent” was for the administrative act of filing 
the return.  See id. at 252.  
 Boyle specifically did not reach the remaining 
categories.  It noted a split of authority as to the second 
category, citing, inter alia, our decision in Sanderling, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1978), as 
among those holding that a taxpayer could show reasonable 
cause where he or she filed (or paid) before what he or she 
was erroneously advised was the deadline.  Boyle, 469 U.S. at 
251 n.9.  The Court explicitly declined to resolve this dispute.  
Id. (“We need not and do not address ourselves to this 
issue.”).  As to the third category, Boyle stated that “[t]his 
case is not one in which a taxpayer has relied on the 
erroneous advice of counsel concerning a question of law.” 
Id. at 250.  In such cases, “[c]ourts have frequently held that 
‘reasonable cause’ is established when a taxpayer shows that 
he reasonably relied on the advice of an accountant or 
attorney that it was unnecessary to file a return, even when 
such advice turned out to have been mistaken.” Id. (citing 
cases).  The Court identified our opinions in Hatfried, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 633-35 (3d Cir. 1947), and 
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Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner,  122 F.2d 843, 848 
(3d Cir. 1941), as among those so holding.   
 The Court drew a distinction between relying an 
expert’s clerical action, as in the first category, and relying on 
expert’s advice, as in the second and third categories.  
Resolving questions of tax law is difficult, and “[m]ost 
taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive 
advice of an accountant or attorney.” Boyle, 469 U.S. at 251.  
“By contrast, one does not have to be a tax expert to know 
that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be 
paid when they are due.” Id.  As the Court noted, lay people 
can and often do file or pay themselves.  Id. at 251-52.  For 
this reason, taxpayers may rely on the advice of an expert but 
may not, for purposes of completing their statutory duty, rely 
on an agent to perform the task of filing or paying. 
 Therefore, we read Boyle as reaching only the first 
category of cases and requiring only that reliance on another 
to perform the ministerial task of filing or paying cannot be 
reasonable cause for failure to file or pay by the deadline.  By 
any account, much less interpreting the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant, that is not what occurred here.  
Hence we hold that a taxpayer’s reliance on the advice of a 
tax expert may be reasonable cause for failure to pay by the 
deadline if the taxpayer can also show either an inability to 
pay or undue hardship from paying at the deadline.  Because 
there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
whether that reliance occurred here, it remains for the District 
Court, after further factfinding, to apply the law in light of 
this holding.   
*    *    *    *    * 
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 Boyle dealt with a “clerical oversight” in failing to file 
a return by the deadline.  It did not rule on when taxpayers 
rely on the advice of an expert, whether that advice relates to 
a substantive question of tax law or identifying the correct 
deadline.  Our case is one of the failure of expert advice, not 
(at least on the record before us) the failure of agent task-
completion. Thus the Estate has the right to make, if it can, 
the showings required to avoid late-payment penalties and 
interest.  We thus vacate and remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings.   
